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Astract 
This contribution focuses on the relation between CSR ideas and policies. On the basis 
of a series of interviews and documents’ analyses, it identifies three professional élites 
- activist-lawyers; financial analysts; and international accountants - as the 
“architects” of the current debate on CSR policies, in the EU context. The author 
questions why and how they succeeded in shaping the public debate on business 
social and environmental accountability. He claims that their views on CSR are 
underpinned by rather different underlying rationales, coming from Law, Finance, and 
Accountancy, and by distinct professional interests. The chapter shows how these 
actors used these arguments to push their (partially) competing agendas and 
professional claims. In particular, the paper focuses on the impact of these 
professions on the European regulatory debate on social and environmental reporting, 
as a lens to study these distinct approaches. The conclusions highlight the need for a 
more reflexive sociological approach to CSR, which would reveal and openly discuss 
the co-existence - under the officialized story - of different rationales and interests. 
As different ideas about what CSR is would have major social, economic and 
environmental implications, it also suggests that advances in CSR depend also from 
the ability of law- and policy-makers to design a regulatory framework that would 
reconcile these different instances.  
1. Introduction. European CSR policies and the role of 
transnational professional communities 
 
Entering the field of CSR reporting, anyone could feel understandably lost in a 
‘forest’ of alternative formulas, which are often used as synonymous: sustainability 
reporting; social and environmental accounting; ESG (Environmental Social and 
Governance) data; non-financial information; etc. Going deeper into this issue, 
differences arise between those who talk about transparency, disclosure or corporate 
accountability. For each of these ‘entry points’ into CSR reporting, multiple choices are 
available to law- and policy-makers, which would radically change the mode and 
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content of CSR reporting regulation (cf. Everett 2004; Bebbington and Gray, 2001; 
Buhr 2007; Mason, 2005; Morgera 2009; Crouch 2010). Disclosure should be left to 
companies’ discretion or mandated by law? What should a company report on? Which 
companies should be required to provide information? To whom managers should be 
held accountable for their decisions? How non-financial information can be verified? 
Adopting a depoliticised and under-socialised approach to this problem, until recently, 
most of the literature and the policy debate was taking for granted that we already 
know what this reporting entails. It was conventionally treated as a technical issue. 
However, more recently, the debate has become more explicitly ‘political’, particularly 
as law- and policy-makers have become increasingly active on this issue. There is a 
growing literature that goes beyond managerial and normative approaches and has 
revealed the co-existence of different, often competing, instances and interests (De 
Schutter, 2008; Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Fairbass 2011; Kinderman, 2013). 
The study aims to contribute to this strand of studies on changes in CSR policies and 
politics, offering an original contribution, which focuses on the role of transnational 
professional communities in shaping the emerging field of CSR reporting regulation at 
the EU level.  
The article is based on a series of interviews with key stakeholders and EU 
policy-makers made between 2011 and 2013 as part of the International PhD ‘Renato 
Treves’ in Law and Society. One of the key findings that emerged from the fieldwork 
was the crucial role played by three professional groups, particularly active in the EU 
debate on regulating CSR reporting: financial analysts; international professional 
accountants; and environmental and human rights lawyers. In particular, as for 
accountants, it highlighted the role of the Federation of European Accountants (FEE), 
in connection with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) and the ‘Big 
Four’ (KPMG, Deloitte, Accenture, and E&Y). As for activist-lawyers, it emerged the 
role of the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), a network of European 
NGOs, assisted in the elaboration of legal proposals by national organisations such as 
the Environmental Law Service, ELS (now Frank Bold), or SHERPA, a Paris-based 
association focused on economic crimes. Lastly, considering financial analysts, it 
emerged, in particular, the role played by the German DVBA and the European 
Federation of Financial Analysts (EFFAS). Building on these insights, the author has 
also systematically analysed the available secondary sources concerning the activities 
of these actors, related to the EU-level policy debate on CSR reporting regulation, 
during the period 2006-2013.  
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The analysis appears to support the research hypothesis. Following the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, EU public authorities shown a willingness to talk 
about CSR regulation and, in particular, transparency and disclosure. This regulatory 
‘window of opportunity’ triggered the interest of human rights and environmental 
activist-lawyers, normally unconcerned about changes in accounting rules, as well as 
financial analysts, usually rather ‘detached’ from social and environmental matters. 
This situation provoked the reaction of international professional accountants, who 
had progressively gained control over accounting rule-making from EU and national 
politics (Dewin and Russell 2007; Botzem 2012) and suddenly had to defend their 
autonomy and legitimate authority.  
Theoretical approach and research methodology 
The theoretical approach deployed by this study is drawing from different 
contributions from accounting, sociology and political economy (e.g. Crouch 2010; 
Dezalay and Madsen 2012; Graz and Nolke, 2007). In particular, it builds on the work 
of Djelic and Quack (2010) on professions and transnational social networks. Namely, 
the study analyses professional accountants; activist-lawyers and financial analysts as 
Transnational Communities (TCs) of professionals. Adopting this theoretical 
framework, the article attempts to go beyond most of the literature, which has been 
overwhelmingly focused on different national ‘models’ (Matten and Moon, 2008; 
Gjolberg 2010) or on certain stakeholders, e.g. employers; NGOs; investors; etc. 
(Ungericht and Hirt, 2010; Kinderman 2013), relegating professional communities to 
the role of individual experts. Djelic and Quack define TCs as social groups that 
emerge from mutual interaction across national boundaries, oriented around a 
common project or 'imagined' identity. This common project or identity is constructed 
and sustained through the active engagement and involvement of at least some of its 
members. Such communities can overlap in different ways with formal organizations. 
However, in principle, they do not need formal organization to be sustained.  
This actor-centred approach perfectly fits the objectives of the study. The aim is 
to generate a number of insights on structural changes, while acknowledging the role 
of agency and reflexivity. In fact, it stresses that the opening up of new regulatory 
spaces (CSR reporting regulation) is likely to generate conflicts over the material and 
symbolic occupation of this space (see also Djelic and and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; 
Djelic and Quack 2012). Furthermore, adopting this historical perspective (Djelic and 
Quack 2007; Djelic and Etchanchu, 2014), it also shed light on cumulative progress of 
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gradual changes, which took place between 2006 and 2013, at different levels of 
regulation and through varying modes of governance.  
To investigate empirically the role of these TCs in the emerging EU regulation of 
CSR, the research applied a “process theory” perspective (cf. Langley 1999; Pierson, 
2004). This research methodology gives particular attention to time ordering of the 
contributory events as a way of capturing the key factors that explain the role of 
different actors in shaping policy and regulatory changes. Similarly to other recent 
studies aimed at empirically exploring changes in the transnational regulation of 
accounting (cfr. Botzem, 2012), the research strategy consists in a "causal 
reconstruction", which links initial conditions to observable outcomes (cf. Mahoney, 
2001; Mayntz, 2004). Rather than being an aprioristic decision, the selection of the 
key actors that have been empirically investigated has gradually emerged from the 
interviews (see Annex 1). Then, in order to strengthen the interviews’ findings, the 
study has systematically assessed changes in the position of these key actors towards 
the EU proposed directive on CSR reporting. This further step has been accomplished 
through a content analysis of the main public documents and press releases the actors 
have issued between 2009 and 2014 on this issues. The document analysis has 
provided a dense understanding of cumulative institutional changes and the interplay 
between different agents in shaping the emerging regulatory field of EU CSR 
reporting. In particular, it has offered insights about the different language, 
arguments and ideas adopted by the three TCs of professionals. To this, it is worth to 
stress that the three competing rationales identified by this study – coming from Law, 
Accountancy and Finance – should be seen as kind of ideal types, representing 
historically and socially constructed institutional paths and competing ‘traditions’. 
 
2. The end of voluntary CSR reporting and the role of professional 
communities  
The years between 2006 and 2011 witnessed a U-turn in the EU regulatory approach 
towards CSR and, in particular, the central issue of transparency and reporting. In 
2005, the Prodi Commission had prepared a draft CSR Communication, based on the 
work of the EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum on CSR (2002-2004), containing a number of 
policy measures. The newly assigned Barroso Commission rejected the draft and 
decided to move the mandate for elaborating a new text from DG Employment (EMPL) 
to DG Enterprise (ENTR), traditionally more ‘business-oriented’. (interviews # 9 and 
12) In 2006, a weak CSR Communication was published, which was “agreed by the 
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Cabinet directly with CSR Europe” (interviews # 2 confirmed by # 9). In response, the 
EU Parliament passed, by a large majority in plenary, a resolution urging the EU 
Commission to extend legal obligations to some key aspects of corporate 
accountability (European Parliament 2007). The EU executive’s reaction was to 
reaffirm that CSR is voluntary and should not be regulated at the EU level. 
(Commission 2007) As a result, all the NGOs decided to boycott and, eventually, 
abandon the EU Forum for CSR. As De Schutter sourly noted, “It is a sad but widely 
accepted truth that, today, the voices of business dominate the European concert.” 
(2008: 236)  
A game-changing moment in this policy debate took place in 2008, after the onset of 
the global financial crisis, when the public pressure on EU policy-makers to act against 
corporate irresponsibility triggered a shift from whether CSR reporting should be 
mandatory to how that could be achieved. The impact of the crisis emerges clearly 
from all the interviews carried out within the Commission and with various 
stakeholders, although opinions about the nature of the change it provoked might 
vary. As pointed out by an experienced EU official: “in ways that we cannot really 
appreciate or calculate”, the financial crisis began to “re-open the question of the role 
of regulation generally”, it began to make regulation “a less dirty word”. (interview # 
12) From being a peripheral issue, suddenly CSR was “back on the EU agenda” 
(EurActive 2010), yet in a different form. It became broader, dealing with new issues 
than just social and environmental protection, such as corruption, risk management 
and corporate taxation (interview # 8). It also became ‘deeper’, reviving fundamental 
questions about the ultimate purpose of business in society (interview# 10). In 2011, 
the EU Commission changed its position and announced that “will present a legislative 
proposal on the transparency of the social and environmental information provided by 
companies in all sector.” (Commission 2011: 15) The section will follow the 
intertwined “moves” of professional accountants; activist-lawyers and financial 
analysts acting and reacting to shape the emerging EU regulatory field of CSR 
reporting.  
2008-2010. The crisis and the momentum for mandatory CSR reporting 
For the scope of this paper, the period that immediately follows the outset of 
the crisis is characterised by four interrelated ‘moves’.  
First, organised civil society seized the momentum for a review of the 
inadequate EU strategy on corporate accountability. Their ongoing absence from the 
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EU initiatives on CSR (MSF CSR and the ‘Alliance for CSR’) was delegitimising this 
process. Therefore, on April 17th 2008, DG ENTR Head of Cabinet and DG EMPL 
Deputy Head of Cabinet met a delegation from ECCJ. An agreement was reached, 
supported by MEP Richard Howitt. The Commission obtained a reconsideration of ECCJ 
participation in the MSF CSR, in return for a review of the EU approach on CSR. In 
February 2009, the agreement was fulfilled. The NGOs went back to the MSF CSR 
while the Commissioner conceded that “regulation and CSR, while being mutually 
exclusive, are dynamic and evolving”, stressing, in particular, the need for talks 
amongst all stakeholders about transparency and non-financials (Verheugen 2009) 
Meanwhile, ECCJ had prepared three legislative proposals, which were sent to the 
Commission and carefully examined, including one on transparency. As it emerged 
from an interview with ECCJ, this moment represented a remarkable shift in the 
attitude of the EU Commission, “because before they were not even thinking about 
any legislative proposal.” (interview #12 with Delaygues, ECCJ)  
From interviews and documents’ analysis emerges the key role of activist-
lawyers within the NGOs group of actors. They are the often ‘invisible hands’ that 
allowed a small organisation like ECCJ (two full-time staff) to match, in terms of 
quality, the activism of CSR Europe and BusinessEurope, enabling it to be engaged on 
different fronts. Quoting Delaygues, “We are a coalition using the strengths of our 
members. For instance, our Czech member [ELS now Frank Bold] is an environmental 
law service. It is an organisation composed of 30 lawyers. So, basically, the legal 
proposals have been developed by them.” Furthermore, “we have as a member FIDH, 
the International Federation of Human Rights. Other proposals have been developed 
by the French platform called SHERPA, which is a lawyers’ organisation.” (interview # 
12) Carefully reconstructing the key role of ECCJ in the post-crisis debate becomes 
apparent that they were trying to re-radicalising CSR, framing it as a matter of human 
rights protection and directors’ liabilities. However, doing so, NGOs were entering into 
a field that is not merely legal and has been traditionally controlled by the accounting 
profession, with which ECCJ did not have any relations (interview # 12). 
Activist-lawyers were not the only professional community that seized the 
momentum. The second move in this ‘game’ was by financial analysts. In effect, 
political reactions to the financial crisis and fear of tough regulation win over an 
increasing section of large institutional investors and asset managers to ‘socially 
responsible investment’. In few months, the SRI community increased dramatically 
and seemed to reach the ‘tipping point’ (UN PRI 2011; Eurosif 2010). However, the 
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lack of reliable KPIs was hampering ESG incorporation into mainstream investment 
analyses and decision-making. Here comes the opportunity for financial analysts to 
take the lead in shaping such framework. 
On March 2008, the DVFA (the German Society of Investment Professionals) 
had launched a set of KPIs for ESG information. This was a peripheral initiative that, 
rather surprisingly, “gained significant attention in the capital market – both in 
Germany and internationally.” (DVFA/EFFAS 2009: 3) Only two months after its 
launch, it received an unqualified endorsement by EFFAS, the European Federation of 
Financial Analysts, and thus gained the status of an official EFFAS Standard. The 
framework was reviewed (April 2009; Sept 2010) and repeatedly proposed to EU 
policy-makers as the first major framework tailored for the needs of investors. This 
potentially set EFFAS in competition with accountants and the big players in the 
sustainability reporting arena (e.g. UNGC, GRI, CDP, ISO 26000) but also attracted 
the attention of the EU Laboratory on ‘valuing non-financials’, which gave cross-
reference to EFFAS KPIs. EFFAS and the Laboratory started to collaborate, conducting 
focus groups with investment professionals and companies to test the framework, 
which was then subjected to public consultation. The final document of the Laboratory 
(CSR Europe 2010) provides striking evidence of the economic significance of ESG 
information and the limits of traditional financial accounting. It maintained that over 
80% of the market value the S&P 500 Index could not be measured in conventional 
accounting terms. Considering the value of the global stock market in 2009, the 
report concluded, this corresponds to an astonishing accounting gap of $40 trillion. 
Commissioner Verheughen was particularly impressed by this activism, affirming that 
the Laboratory could contribute to “a quiet revolution in the way that enterprises can 
measure and communicate their non-financial performance.” (EFFAS 2009a) This 
change in investors’ perception and the rising interest of investors for mandatory ESG 
was confirmed also by the stronger position taken by EUROSIF (European Socially 
Responsible Investors). As ECCJ before, in February 2009, it officially sent three 
legislative proposals to the Commission, including mandatory CSR reporting for large 
listed companies (Eurosif 2009).  
The third crucial move was taken by the EU Commission, which gradually 
shifted its position on regulating CSR reporting. Following Mr Verheughen’s speech, 
between September 2009 and February 2010 DG ENTR organised a series of 
workshops open to all stakeholders on ESG reporting (adopting financial analysts’ 
jargon). A key role in this process of internal adjustment of the Commission’s 
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positions on CSR was played by part of the financial sector, which added its weight to 
NGOs asking for detailed mandatory ESG information. (interviews # 7; 10 and 15) As 
explained by another EU official (interview # 12), if you take the investment 
community out, you have NGOs versus business. “Very black and white.” But “when 
you got some mainstream financial analysts saying, ‘there is something in here that 
we need to know more about’ or ‘the information we get is not good enough.’ Then, 
the debate is, at least, triangular […] Then it is not simply the NGOs’ agenda. It 
becomes, if I am honest, an easier agenda to sell.” As confirmed by another EU 
officer: “we have considered the fact that investors are discussing this one of the key 
evidence that markets were demanding for increase transparency. (interview # 11) 
Significantly, in the conclusions of the EU Workshops is possible to read: “a 
decision not to change EU policy would send a strong political message to enterprises 
and other stakeholders that the European Union believes business-as-usual is 
desirable and feasible, whereas the multiple sustainability challenges we face demand 
fundamental change. […] ESG disclosure is a political issue not just a technical issue. 
Tinkering is not a political message”. (Commission 2009b: 3) However, while “the 
number of supporters of mandatory CSR had increased significantly and were close to 
reach a critical mass” (interview # 10), any formal initiative was prevented by the 
“need for a coherent approach” with the position taken by the same Commission only 
two years before. (interview # 8). During this time, DG Internal Market (MARKT), 
responsible for EU accounting law, started “listening carefully and taking note of the 
rising importance of CSR” but opposed any legislative action. (interview # 10) Things 
changed when the new Barroso Commission was appointed, on February 2010, and 
Michel Barnier, a French politician widely seen as having dirigiste economic view, was 
appointed as DG MARKT Commissioner. The issue of CSR/ESG reporting moved to his 
hands and he asked the Accounting and Financial Reporting Unit to work on the 
review of Article 46(1)(b) of the Fourth Company Law directive, which already 
contained a reference to voluntary disclosure of non-financial KPIs. 
 This gradual shift of EU policy-makers away from voluntary CSR reporting, and 
the activism of financial analysts and lawyers could threaten professional accountants’ 
power. This had already been weakened by the financial crisis (off-balance sheet 
accounting and fair value accounting were identified as important causes) and the G20 
(15 November 2008) had openly questioned the governance structure of accounting 
standard-setters, calling for immediate actions (G20, 2008: 6). Therefore, while the 
rise of mandatory CSR reporting could have represented a good business opportunity 
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for accountants (e.g. Deloitte and the Economist Unit, 2004; KPMG 2008; KPMG et al. 
2010 and 2013), the question was whether they were in a position to take it. In fact, 
moving too far away from financial accounting (e.g. human rights due diligence, 
carbon disclosure, water consumption) could cast doubt on their professional authority 
and expertise. 
 The most explicit response to this challenge came already in December 2008. 
The FEE (Federation of European Accountants) published a discussion paper which 
was aimed at sending out three messages (FEE 2008). First, sustainability reporting is 
a matter of accounting standards and EU Accounting Law. The document mentions the 
existence of International Accounting Standards (IAS) that are already able to address 
the problem and stresses that a requirement had been already introduced in 2003 by 
the Modernisation Directive and the focus should be on strengthening it. Secondly, on 
the contrary of ECCJ or EFFAS, accountants’ demanded for ‘guidance’ from public 
authorities, not yet regulation. Thirdly, as regards the content, references to the 
environment or human rights that could be seen in both ECCJ and EFFAS’ documents 
are almost accidental. The key problem is identified in the lack of ‘materiality’ and 
‘relevance’ of existing sustainability reporting. On January 2009, FEE published a 
policy statement on the contribution of the profession to sustainability. The document 
invites “accountants within and outside organizations […] to help operationalising this 
general concept at the level of strategy formulation, process improvement and 
performance measurement” building “on the broad and important role it [the 
profession] already plays regarding the relevance and reliability of financial and other 
information.” (FEE 2009) On 29 April 2009, FEE and EUROSIF organised a roundtable, 
hosted by the European Parliament, which was later used by DG ENTR as a model for 
the EU Workshops on ESG reporting. Significantly, the speakers featured DVFA 
Managing Director, Ralf Frank; the CEO of the GRI; Pedro Ortùn, Director of DG ENTR; 
and other representatives from companies and institutional investors. It stands out 
the absence of any voice from civil society. The ‘call for action’ issued at the end of 
the conference by the two organisations is motivated by “the current climate of 
financial and economic crisis” but does not contain any precise reference to social and 
environmental matters. It translates the problem into a question of “helping to restore 
trust in business.” (FEE/EUROSIF 2009)  
FEE/Eurosif roundtable set the tone for a much more ambitious project aimed to 
establish a closer dialogue on this issue between accountants, financial analysts and 
large institutional investors. Following a meeting in London (December 2009) hosted 
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by The Prince of Wales’ – to which intervened some of the key private standard-
setting bodies both in financial and non-financial reporting – a new regulatory 
initiative was launched: the International Connected Reporting Committee, soon 
renamed International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC). Its far-reaching objective 
was to create an “internationally accepted” framework able to integrate financial and 
non-financial information in one concise and material communication. The reins of the 
IIRC were taken by Paul Druckman, Chairman of FEE Sustainability Policy Group and 
former President of the ICAEW (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & 
Wales).  
 
2011 – 2013. Regulating non-financial disclosure 
The year 2011 marked a new phase in the EU debate on CSR reporting regulation. 
Following a public consultation (November 2010 and February 2011), which attracted 
over 300 responses (Commission 2011), in April 2011, the EU Commission officially 
announced that “will present a legislative proposal on the transparency of the social 
and environmental information provided by companies in all sectors.” (Commission 
2011a: 15) The document stresses investors’ power and business’ freedom. The 
measure is meant to use “the tremendous financial lever of the European asset-
management industry (EUR 7 000 billion in 2009) […] to promote the development of 
businesses which have chosen […] to pursue objectives of general interest or relating 
to social, ethical or environmental development.” (Commission 2011a: 15 emphases 
added) Notably, this is part of a broader transnational phenomenon that had seen, in 
the lapse of few years, the emergence of “an increasingly dense regulatory network of 
international and national standards, codes and guidelines as well as legislation for 
sustainability reporting.” (KPMG et al. 2010: 4)  As mentioned above, at the EU-level, 
a key role should be attributed to the political leadership and ambition of the new DG 
MARKT Commissioner, Michel Barnier. According to a senior EU official, the inclusion 
of non-financial reporting in the Single Market Act (SMA) “was a political priority for 
the Commissioner.” (interview # 10) Another EU official confirmed that the shift in the 
EU policy debate on CSR reporting “can be reduced to two words: Barnier plus the 
financial crisis.” (interview #12) An expert group was set up, to which participated 
some key figures from activist-lawyers (Filip Gregor, ELS/ECCJ); analysts and the 
financial community (Claudia Kruse, APG/EFFAS/ICGN) as well as various international 
accountants (representatives from PwC, IIRC and FEE)  (July 2011). On October 2011, 
the announcement was reiterated in the CSR Communication, which also outlined a 
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new definition of CSR, coherent with the intent to overcome the old voluntary 
approach. However, while the SMA had pledged a proposal “by the end of the year” 
(SMA), this only arrived in April 2013 and, as compared to the anticipation that 
existed in the previous phase, was rather modest (Monciardini, 2014).  
Instead of integrating non-financial KPIs in the existing financial strategy and 
operations of large companies, the EC proposal required companies to write just a 
statement on their policies, results and risk-related aspects as regards four broad 
areas of CSR: social and environmental matters, human protection and anti-
corruption. This approach re-enforced the distinction between financial and non-
financial disclosure, setting CSR aside from corporate governance and business 
strategy. Companies were suggested an open list of existing international and national 
frameworks, without imposing them any specific set of detailed KPIs – as both 
investors and NGOs had been demanding. In so doing, the EU lost a precious 
opportunity to shape the global regulatory debate and made comparability 
impervious. Furthermore, companies could decide not to disclose information in one or 
more of these areas, explaining why that was the case (report-or-explain). No 
mechanisms to verify such information were introduced, undermining the reliability of 
the statement. Overall, while the scope of the proposal was ambitious – the 
Commission estimated that about 18,000 large companies would have been affected, 
across all sectors – the EC proposal fall short of its objective to enhance information’s 
quality. 
Why has the Commission presented such a weak legal draft? What prevented 
the EU from reaching, after so many years of debates, a forward-looking, sound and 
strong outcome? According to my analysis there are three main reasons. Certainly, as 
pointed out by Kinderman (2013), we should consider the firm opposition of European 
enterprises, in particular SMEs, (de Buck, 2010), led by the German employers’ 
associations (BDA/BDI) (interviews # 10. 11 and 12). As confirmed by various 
sources (interviews # 11 and 12; Kinderman 2013; Howitt 2014), this position was 
supported by the German Cabinet of Angela Merkel, making the adoption of a far-
reaching reform by the EU Council extremely complicated. Secondly, the financial 
crisis had turned into a sovereign debt crisis. Therefore the regulatory priorities and 
power-struggles had shifted. If by 2010 mandatory CSR reporting could be seen as 
mirroring a stronger position of the state in its regulatory role, by 2013 governments 
were seen again as ‘the problem’. Imposing rules on business was politically difficult. 
As synthesized by a top EU officer, at the beginning they “wanted to go far, to do 
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something that really make a difference”, then “overtime and working with other 
DGs”, they “realized that you cannot go too far. Because otherwise you would have a 
backlash with the industry, with the associations, with some Member States.” 
(interview # 10) However, there is also a third element, perhaps less apparent, 
related to what Dezalay (1991) called ‘territorial battles and tribal disputes’ that are 
the subject of this article. The accounting profession was able to ‘neutralise’ this 
potentially threatening development and effectively push back activist-layers and 
financial analysts, exploiting its strategic positions within the accounting regulatory 
field.  
During this phase, the accountants’ community was able to ‘play’ multiple 
identities: independent external experts (FEE, PwC, IIRC), private and public standard 
setters (IASB, EFRAG) and, in particular, EU policy-makers (Unit F3, DG MARKT). On 
the other hand, according to the interviewees, activist-lawyers’ and financial analysts 
had only external and limited access to the work of DG MARKT (interviews # 6; 7; 
15). The fact that the file was assigned to the ‘Accounting and financial reporting’ Unit 
(instead of, for instance, the Corporate Governance and CSR Unit) was extremely 
consequential for the future legislative proposal unveiled in April 2013. As it emerged 
from the fieldwork, this created a paradoxical situation. Most of the Unit had a 
professional and educational background in financial accounting. Therefore, they 
lacked a good understanding of social and environmental matters and their relevance. 
As one officer admitted “we are not CSR experts.” (interview # 10) The issue was new 
to this Unit, which only in 2010 started to “build up some knowledge” on it (interview 
# 10). Drawing on the accounting mindset, the word CSR or even ESG was shelved. 
The proposal refers to ‘non-financial’ disclosure, a non-definition that reveals the 
discomfort of financial accountants in dealing with something else than financial 
information, something broad and hard to define (Monciardini, 2013).  
Since the beginning, the Unit decided to rely on existing reporting frameworks, 
rather than developing a EU set of KPIs, because “there is no need to re-invent the 
wheel” (interviews 10; 11; 12). However, DG Environment (ENV) assessment for a 
parallel, similar initiative had reached exactly the opposite conclusion (interview # 
14). Because of the lack of standardized a reliable methodologies for reporting, the EU 
should proceed to an harmonization of the fragmented regulatory landscape. 
Otherwise, “claims and reports would continue to vary in ambition (i.e. quality of 
information and scope) and would not allow any sort of comparison or benchmarking.” 
(Commission 2013b) In effect, according to the interviews, DG ENV would have 
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preferred “a detailed and rather prescriptive regulatory approach to ESG disclosure”, 
closer to a mandatory version of the EMAS scheme. In the Impact Assessment of the 
Communication ‘Building the Single Market for Green Product’ (Commission 2012b), 
DG ENV services even stated that DG MARKT’s initiative “will not propose a detailed 
methodology for reporting this information, nor specify what elements of 
environmental performance need to be reported on. Without further intervention on 
these aspects, the reliability, comparability, relevance, and completeness of the 
environmental information would fall short of stakeholders' needs, particularly 
investors [...]” Simultaneously, outside the walls of the EU Commission, the 
accounting profession became very active in creating this reporting framework that 
would fit the void described by DG ENV. During this phase, the IIRC was able to gain 
the support of all the main private standard-setters in the field of financial and non-
financial accounting (interview #19). However, in FEE position papers the word 
‘sustainability’ or ‘social and environmental reporting’ was substituted by their ‘own’ 
concept of <IR> Integrated Reporting, as developed by the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC). Significantly, EFFAS soon decided not to continue developing 
its own ESG standards, joining the efforts of the IIRC. In effect, the final version of 
the International <IR> Framework, issued in 2013, confirms also the influence of 
financial analysts and the financial community. While initially the Framework was 
designed to vehicle the “information needed by investors and other stakeholders” 
(IIRC 2011: 8), the final version refers only to the needs of capital providers (IIRC 
2013). 
Overall, as compared to the documents prepared by the Commission between 
2008 and 2010, these prepared by DG MARKT (expert group, impact assessment, 
legislative proposal) tend to reduce CSR reporting to a technical issue, not a political 
one. The arguments for introducing this reform are based on “suboptimal allocation of 
capital” and improving “company performance”, “while limiting any undue 
administrative burden” for business (IA, EU proposal). This rationale could be applied 
to financial accounting reforms. Human rights protection and the reduction of carbon 
emissions are treated as ‘market failures’ and a matter of ‘market efficiency’ while 
transparency becomes an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. 
After the Commission unveiled its proposal, leaving almost everyone 
disappointed (EurActive, 2013), the battlefield moved to the Trilogue negotiation with 
the EU Parliament and the Council. The Parliament had been traditionally supportive of 
strong mandatory CSR reporting and had recently adopted two resolutions 
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acknowledging the importance of CSR and transparency (European Parliament 2013). 
At the Parliament, activist-lawyers could count again on strong relations to influence 
the legislative process. On the other hand, at the EU Council some Member States, in 
particular Germany, were determined to further weaken the reform or block any 
attempt to strengthen it. Finally, an agreement was reached on March 2014, which led 
to entry into force of the directive on the 6 December 2014. The Council obtained a 
considerable limitation of the directive’s scope: the number of business entities 
affected by the directive dropped from 18,000 to 6,000. On the other hand, the 
Parliament obtained the inclusion of information about supply chains’ due diligence 
processes. Furthermore, it managed to limit the application of the so-called "safe 
harbour clause", which allows companies to avoid disclosure if the information would 
be seriously prejudicial to the entity’s commercial interests. Two issues that had been 
raised by ECCJ activist-lawyers (ECCJ 2014). Notably, it was also introduced a review 
mechanism, which will oblige the Commission to produce, by the end of 2016, non-
binding guidelines for reporting (including relevant KPIs). By 2018, the Commission 
will also have to publish a detailed report on the directive implementation 
accompanied, if appropriate, by legislative proposals.  
 
4. What counts? Accountancy, Finance and Law’s competing 
regulatory rationales  
In order to understand the different definitions of CSR disclosure projected by 
financial analysts, activist-lawyers and international accountants, one should consider 
the underlying rationales that underpin them, relying on Finance, Law and 
Accountancy knowledge and values. In effect, according to Djelic and Quack (2010), 
the way TCs affect governance is by creating transnational ‘problem spaces’, where 
individuals and organizations can meet and collaborate. Through discussion and, 
sometimes, conflict, preference transformations are framed and compromise solutions 
are found, leading to a continuous (re)elaboration of ‘shared ideas’. Each TC has 
therefore elaborated a different view of CSR reporting’s content, purpose and 
regulation. Their distinct views even led to the adoption of different terms to define it: 
non-financials; ESG; social and environmental reporting.  
Traditionally, international accountants had a defensive position towards CSR 
reporting. Although part of the profession has been working on this issue for decades, 
this elaboration has been isolated from the principles and practices of mainstream 
business reporting. Unlike financial information, ‘non-financials’ are often made of 
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qualitative and narrative information. Therefore, accountants face the difficulty – if not 
impossibility – of communicating it in a concise, reliable and comparable manner. This 
standing could be synthesized by the idea that ‘this is not accounting’. Historically, 
professional accountants had a key role in keeping ‘non-financial’ elements out of the 
multi-level regulatory framework for business reporting (IAS, EU and national 
requirements). In the 1970s, across Europe, there was a vibrant legislative debate 
about social reporting, which was sidelined starting from the 1980s as the focus 
shifted to financial accounting standards only and their harmonization, seen as a pre-
condition for global markets’ integration (Monciardini 2013). As financial accounting 
rule-making became increasingly privatized, transnational and complex, for 
international accountants became particularly important “the establishment of clearly 
limited jurisdictions in which professional dominance is exercised.” (Botzem 2012:47) 
Social and environmental exclusion from accounting was functional to the 
establishment of this power strategy, aimed at the monopolization of responsibilities 
and competencies. Social closure then was achieved via education, internal control 
and professional norms and values strictly focused on financial information. This is 
reflected in the language used by the profession in describing social and 
environmental reporting as ‘what-it-is-not’: non-financial information. This socially 
and historically constructed distinction financial/non-financial played a key role as a 
structuring principle for the emergence of an autonomous professional field translated 
into rules and practices. It became ‘natural’, up to the point that accountants tend to 
take it for granted.   
This position on CSR reporting regulation has been very consequential: CSR 
information was left out of financial disclosure standards and principles. Companies 
can communicate it on a voluntary basis, choosing amongst various existing reporting 
frameworks. The letter prepared by the FEE for the 2011 EU public consultation 
advices against establishing requirements at a national or European level on social 
and environmental reporting. “Instead, the European Union should contribute to the 
development of global standards […].” The letter also calls the attention to the 
problem of avoiding “any risk of ‘boilerplate’ text in reports to investors, we should 
ensure that financial statements reflect the most relevant information.” (FEE, 2011: 3) 
Similarly, after the publication of the EU Commission legislative proposal, the 
President of ICAEW, Sleigh-Johnson, warned: “If the information is not bespoke and of 
relevance to investors, it will just lead to clutter and ‘boilerplate’.” (EurActive, 2013) 
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According to this rather narrow view, non-financial information should be considered 
only if they fit into the characterization used for financial disclosure.  
 Activist-lawyers offer a completely different rationale for mandatory CSR 
reporting, which is related to transparency and the ‘right to know’ about the impact of 
corporations on society and the environment. They relate social and environmental 
accounting raison d’être to corporate accountability and the concern over the power 
and influence of corporations on “every aspect of our lives: water, gas, news, 
environment, schools and even unborn babies.” (Mitchell and Sikka 2005) As Gray 
pointed out, “accountability is based on the principal of rights to information – rights 
which derive from a number of sources: legal, quasi-legal, moral and so on.” (2005: 
3) According to this view, the state has the duty to protect and provide access to 
remedies, while corporations have the responsibility to respect, in particular, the 
environment and human rights (cf. Mares 2011). Stressing transparency as a tool for 
corporate justice means bringing accounting standard-setting bodies back into the 
domain of law. In other words, CSR reporting becomes part of the construction of a 
broader legal framework, which subordinates relevance to investors and markets’ 
efficiency to the need of addressing urgent human and environmental challenges. In 
particular, carbon disclosure and transparency on working conditions in MNEs’ supply 
chains stand out (ECCJ 2008; SOMO 2013; Augenstein 2010).  
The use of legal arguments by activist-lawyers can be retrieved in several 
documents (e.g. FIDH 2010; ECCJ 2010; CORE 2011). For instance, “Information is 
essential to uphold human rights because it helps to prevent abuses, hold companies 
to account and seek remedies. ‘Abuses always happen in the dark’. Disclosure can 
also prevent abuses by enhancing the participation of people whose rights might be 
affected. The right to know is also a human right. Courts need information in order to 
function, and in this way ESG disclosure is linked to provision of remedies.” 
(Commission 2009a) In its reply to the EU Public Consultation, ECCJ argued: “It is 
frequently reported that core international labour rights are being abused in these 
factories. However, companies rarely disclose who are their suppliers which makes it 
difficult if not impossible to track the goods and for consumers to learn in what 
conditions the products have been manufactured. Likewise, claims of such companies 
to protect workers’ rights are rendered meaningless when the workers themselves are 
unable to access such protection.” (2011: 3) In these documents, accountability 
becomes a means to redefine corporate responsibilities, often translating them into 
managers’ liabilities. For instance, one of ECCJ publication highlights that, according 
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to the Seventh Company Directive, Member States are required “to hold the 
management of companies liable for the fulfillment of reporting duties and to establish 
effective and dissuasive penalties.” (ECCJ 2010) 
As maintained above, activist-lawyers were not the only ones to contend to 
professional accountants the control over the emerging field of what they would call 
‘ESG information’. Their rationale for mandatory ESG reporting represents a ‘blow’ to 
professional accountants’ argument against regulating this matter. They highlight 
that, currently, financial statements only capture a small and declining fraction of the 
market value of large listed companies. It has been estimated that, until the 1980s, 
financial reports used to account for 80% of the market value of the S&P 500 Index. 
In the 1990s, this percentage had already decreased to 55% and currently it 
represents less than 20%. In other words, non-financial information would account for 
over 80% of the value of listed companies (cf. Ocean Tomo 2010). While only part of 
this value can be captured looking at ESG data, there is a growing consensus and 
some convincing empirical evidence that more ‘sustainable companies’ tend to be 
better managed (see Bauer and Hann 2010; Kruse and Lundbergh 2010; Deutsche 
Bank 2012). As a consequence, they also attract a better class of employees, are 
better able to manage risks, can count on stronger visibility and better reputation and, 
in the long-term, perform better. Therefore, financial analysts are increasingly 
interested in ESG information that could help to address this huge gap between book 
and market value.  
The final document produced by the EU laboratory “Valuing non-financial 
performance” organized by EFFAS offers striking evidence of the strategic economic 
relevance of non-financial and ESG data. In particular, it maintains that “the real story 
is the growth of future earnings as the primary determinant of company market value. 
This is the projection of current or immediate past performances into the future.” 
However, it adds, future earning streams are “by their nature, difficult to quantify and 
control. The ability to recruit and retain people with skills and knowledge to maintain 
and develop products and services and drive innovation. The loyalty of customers to 
brand and their willingness to forsake new or more innovative competitors. The 
continued supply of resources of the right quality and at the right price. The 
management and mitigation of risk. Reputation management and avoidance of 
regulation impingement on licence to operate.” (CSR Europe 2010) Most of these 
information concern ‘immaterial’ and ‘non-financial’ assets that are largely absent 
from the narrow approach taken by the IAS. EFFAS 2009 Conference on ESG, 
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significantly titled ESG Mainstreaming: Looking for something that has already found 
us?, testified this change of perspective. “Demanding proof for the effects of good 
ESG performance on the bottom line of corporates has been a volkssport in capital 
markets for many years.” Now “we simply assume (or for agnostics: pretend) that a 
corporate managing, measuring and disclosing ESG is the default.“ As materiality is 
not objectively but subjectively determined, this emerging belief and assumption 
appear as the normative foundation for a new approach to measure value creation 
that could supersede the financial/non-financial divide (see Porter and Kramer 2011).  
The response to the threat posed by activist-lawyers and financial analysts to 
the control of professional accountants over their ‘territory’ was twofold. On the one 
side, as we have argued, they were able to channel the EU directive within the 
existing financial accounting legislative framework. Mandatory CSR reporting was 
limited to a ‘statement’ that listed companies have to prepare on a report-or-explain 
basis, without any verification mechanism. On the other hand, the profession had a 
crucial role in setting up an ambitious internationally accepted framework for 
integrating financial and non-financial information: the 2013 International <IR> 
Framework. Accountants hoped that the launch of this private and transnational global 
regulatory initiative would allow them to lead and control this transformation.  
The launch of the <IR> Framework marks a dramatic change in the position of 
mainstream professional accountants. They acknowledge that the existing reporting 
model is too long, backward-looking, disconnected and unable “to keep pace” with 
changes in value creation and with societal and environmental concerns. (IIRC 2011) 
Therefore, they would accept the prospective of going beyond financial information, 
integrating different strands of reporting. This shift is presented as “an idea whose 
time has come.” (King 2012) The aim of the IIRC is to “forge a global consensus on 
the direction in which reporting needs to evolve” providing “a clear, concise picture of 
performance, impacts and interdependencies.”  (IIRC, 2011: 7 and 5) However, rather 
than integrating, the final <IR>Framework (IIRC, 2013) expands the current rationale 
for financial accounting to new terrains, including social and environmental 
information. Crucially, it subordinates social and environmental issues to a materiality 
test, sacrificing stakeholders’ instances to these of capital providers only. So doing, 
international professional accountants ‘conquer’ new space in the emerging areas of 
ESG reporting. They alienated NGOs and civil society but gained the crucial support of 
financial analysts and the financial community.  
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5. Conclusions. Towards a reflexive sociological approach 
The article has provided an exploratory analysis of the competing professional 
claims and underlying rationales of international professional accountants, financial 
analysts and activist-lawyers as regards the content and mode of the EU emerging 
regulation of CSR reporting. Drawing on Djelic and Quack (2010), it has deployed a 
reflexive sociological approach to this subject matter, considering these three 
professional elites as ‘transnational communities’ (TCs). The findings of the fieldwork 
and the documents’ analysis suggest that the 2008 financial crisis overturned the 
original EU Commission standing for voluntary CSR, in particular, in the key area of 
transparency and disclosure. This regulatory window of opportunity attracted the 
interest of human rights and environmental lawyers as well as financial analysts, 
normally unconcerned about the definition of accounting standards. On the other 
hand, it provoked the reaction of professional accountants that managed to maintain, 
for the moment, their control over the field of business reporting regulation. 
Adopting this reflexive sociological approach to CSR regulation, the researcher 
has been able to trespass some of the lines that characterise the current literature. In 
fact, one of the consequences of the growing complexity and expansion of CSR 
reporting is that the literature struggles to deal with such an interdisciplinary and 
multi-layered subject, situated at the crossroads of various disciplines. Furthermore, 
there is the complexity of studying a transnational regulation, which is transforming 
ad infinitum making the boundaries of such subject institutionally, territorially and 
content-wise dynamic (Zumbansen 2011; Madsen 2006). Therefore, any 
comprehensive exploration of CSR has to be adjusted to the indeterminacy of the 
research object, producing cross-pollination between its many components, without 
being hampered by pre-defined distinctions between ‘social’ and ‘economic’; ‘financial’ 
and ‘non-financial’; ‘mandatory’ and ‘voluntary’; etc. A reflexive sociological 
‘polycentric approach’ contains untapped intellectual resources to explore undergoing 
transformations, not excluding any of the co-producers of these changes. This 
approach could be particularly relevant as it reveals that different rationales for CSR 
reporting would have major social, economic and environmental implications.  
As for future researches the study suggests that the ‘intrusion’ of activist-
lawyers and financial analysts is turning the fied of CSR reporting  between two 
‘opposite poles’: transparency and materiality. As stated in one of the documents of 
the EU Workshops on ESG disclosure (Commission 2009: 4), “Although they are not 
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mutually exclusive, transparency and materiality correspond to different stakeholders 
with different constituencies and agendas, each legitimate in its own right, and they 
can sometimes be conflicting. Transparency values the disclosure of data for its own 
sake, sometimes as a question of principle. Materiality seeks to define which data is 
actually important in terms of influencing the decisions of the intended recipients of 
the information.” It is the role of politics and public authorities to find a middle ground 
between the two positions in the regulation of CSR reporting. It is clear that any 
equilibrium between the two principles will be the outcome of struggles about the 
autonomy of business from external – social and political control. However, this 
tension could be potentially creative of a new regime of “economic governance—not 
just corporate governance, though it has implications for that, but also governance of 
the economy and even of society at large.” (Maclean and Crouch 2012: 1)  
 
 
 
,Annex List of Interviews 
 
# NAME ORGANISATION DATE 
1 EU official * EU Commission 22/04/2010 
2 EU official** EU Commission 30/04/2010 
3 Bertazzi Pietro Global Reporting Initiative 08/04/2011 
4 Iansen-Rogers 
Jennifer 
KPMG Sustainability, The Netherlands 28/04/2011 
5 Walkate Harald Aegon Asset Management (VP) 02/06/2011 
6 Claudia Kruse 
(phone) 
APG /financial analysts/ICGN 06/06/2011 
7 Delaygues Yolaine ECCJ (NGO) 17/06/2011 
8 EU official EU Commission 26/06/2012 
9 EU official * EU Commission 23/07/2012 
10 EU official EU Commission 25/07/2012 
11 EU official EU Commission 30/07/2012 
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12 EU official** EU Commission 08/08/2012 
13 Mortier Gaetan SRI expert (former MSCI) 07/09/2012 
14 EU official EU Commission 03/11/2012 
15 Passant François EUROSIF 22/01/2013 
16 Dolan Carl (phone) Transparency International (NGO) 24/01/2013 
17 Norberg Claes 
(phone) 
BusinessEurope/Accountant 30/01/2013 
18 Capron Michel 
(email) 
Paris University/ECCJ/Lawyer 01/03/2013 
19 Mio Chiara (phone) Venice University/FEE/Accountant 05/04/2013 
 
*/** Out of 19 in-depth, semi-structured, élite interviews, two EC officers (# 1; # 2) have 
been interviewed twice (also # 9; # 12), because of the relevance of their information. This allowed 
the researcher to better assess changes over time in the perception of CSR reporting regulation 
within the EC. It also allowed to verify information that had emerged progressively from the 
fieldwork. In four cases it has been impossible to arrange a meeting for an interview in person. 
Therefore the interviewee has been reached by phone. In only one case (Prof. Capron), the 
questions/answers have been exchanged by email. 
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